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According to the report, military failures are not the Kremlin's biggest problem. Putin has long since lost Russia to the West, which has provided it with economic and technological progress for centuries. This opinion was voiced on the pages of The New York Times by Professor Michael Kimmage of the Catholic University of America. One of Putin’s main goals in invading Ukraine in 2022 was to demonstrate the decline of the West. The Kremlin was confident that the West, as in the past, would not be united and decisive in supporting Ukraine. Putin wanted to present Russia as a resurgent geopolitical force. However, in reality, he not only failed to capture all of Ukraine but also suffered a geopolitical defeat. Putin's brutal war has only united Europe and finally turned it against Russia. The historian traced the links between Europe and Russia back to the 17th century.
The report also stated that it was not so much about wars as about close economic relations that provided Russia with both military might and economic growth. Even during the Soviet era, Moscow and Europe continued to interact. However, under Putin, relations with the West began to deteriorate. The historian noted that Putin did not want to sever ties with Europe, but wanted to regain his leadership role. If he had seized Ukraine in 2022, he could have achieved what he wanted: the West would have been forced to bow to him and reduce the size of NATO. However, in reality, Putin only united Europe and made it an adversary of Russia. Since then, Europe has been doing everything possible to reduce trade relations with Russia. The West can afford to lose Russia, but in reality, it would prefer to have a peaceful and predictable Russia at its side. For Russia itself, such a loss is a strong blow and a setback. This is Putin's choice and Russia's tragedy.
The report added that many Russians fail to view external threats in the same way as Putin and the siloviki. Although Russian society lacks political agency, it does possess sufficient autonomy to evaluate much of the state’s messaging. The Kremlin’s capacity to shape mass attitudes falls short of what its Soviet predecessor was able to do. Socioeconomic, political, and cultural transformations since the USSR collapsed have shortened the state’s reach into society. Today’s political elites also recognize a self-interest in enabling societal autonomy: They know that the Soviet system’s totalism was self-defeating and prefer burden-sharing and load-shedding. Russians still rely on the state, particularly if they hold public-sector jobs, but much less so compared to what was the case in Soviet times. Challenging stereotypes of paternalism, close to 60 percent of Russians believe that the success of their long-term plans depends more on their own initiative than on state support.
Watch the report on the YouTube link.
The report also stated that it was not so much about wars as about close economic relations that provided Russia with both military might and economic growth. Even during the Soviet era, Moscow and Europe continued to interact. However, under Putin, relations with the West began to deteriorate. The historian noted that Putin did not want to sever ties with Europe, but wanted to regain his leadership role. If he had seized Ukraine in 2022, he could have achieved what he wanted: the West would have been forced to bow to him and reduce the size of NATO. However, in reality, Putin only united Europe and made it an adversary of Russia. Since then, Europe has been doing everything possible to reduce trade relations with Russia. The West can afford to lose Russia, but in reality, it would prefer to have a peaceful and predictable Russia at its side. For Russia itself, such a loss is a strong blow and a setback. This is Putin's choice and Russia's tragedy.
The report added that many Russians fail to view external threats in the same way as Putin and the siloviki. Although Russian society lacks political agency, it does possess sufficient autonomy to evaluate much of the state’s messaging. The Kremlin’s capacity to shape mass attitudes falls short of what its Soviet predecessor was able to do. Socioeconomic, political, and cultural transformations since the USSR collapsed have shortened the state’s reach into society. Today’s political elites also recognize a self-interest in enabling societal autonomy: They know that the Soviet system’s totalism was self-defeating and prefer burden-sharing and load-shedding. Russians still rely on the state, particularly if they hold public-sector jobs, but much less so compared to what was the case in Soviet times. Challenging stereotypes of paternalism, close to 60 percent of Russians believe that the success of their long-term plans depends more on their own initiative than on state support.
Watch the report on the YouTube link.